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This paper provides a brief overview of the economic environment in 
Maharashtra including the socio-economic development of the state as a 
backdrop. Within this context we assess and analyze the fiscal situation 
in Maharashtra. We, examine both, the relative performance vis-à-vis 
other major states of the Indian union and look at its temporal 
performance over a ten year period. The power sector has been 
discussed as a bottleneck to growth of Maharashtra’s economy thereby 
adding to the fiscal woes of the state. Cotton Monopoly Scheme and 
Sugar co-operatives have also been touched upon. For the reform 
package to be comprehensive we would like to see policy measures 
being initiated at three levels: policies at the level of the state, which are 
financial and administrative in the main; policies that the central 
government must pursue in its dealing with the states and the third type 
that are overarching in a sense that they concern the governments at all 
levels and have to do with capacity building as well as having pragmatic 
regulatory framework in place. 
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 FISCAL HEALTH OF MAHARASHTRA: 
A Stock Taking Exercise 
 
1.  Introduction 
The Indian federal setup has traditionally been loaded in favor of the center. It 
was hoped the passage of the 73
rd and 74
th Constitutional Amendments Acts in 1992 and 
1993 would result in a transformation in the fiscal scenario of the economy. However, a 
decade down the line when one takes stock of the situation, de facto decentralization is 
conspicuous by its absence. Functional and expenditure responsibilities lack clarity and 
neither the matching resources nor resource raising powers have been adequately 
devolved. At each of the three tiers of government i.e. the center, the state and local level, 
it is of utmost importance that the role of the State and its areas of intervention be 
delimited and well defined. For a comprehensive reform package, the problems faced by 
each of the three tiers of government will need to be tackled. This paper attempts to 
understand the fiscal problems being confronted at the level of state governments, with 
the state of Maharshtra being our focus.     
Although the focus of this paper is to look at the fiscal health of the state of 
Maharashtra, we would like to begin with broad strokes on a wider canvas and look at the 
economic environment in Maharashtra. Section 2 of the paper assesses Maharashtra’s 
growth performance. Both size and pattern of growth are important to examine in order to 
yield a proper perspective. Section 3 discusses the demographic pattern and socio-
economic development of the state and provides the backdrop in which we examine and 
analyze the fiscal situation in Maharashtra. The fiscal scenario in Maharashtra is 
examined in the context of its relative performance vis-à-vis other major states of the 
Indian union as also its temporal performance over a ten year period is studied in section 
4 of the paper. Section 5 takes a closer look at the performance of Maharashtra since the 
Medium Term Reform package was initiated. The Power sector represents one of the 
bottlenecks to growth of Maharashtra’s economy. Problems confronting this sector and 
reform measures initiated have been discussed in Section 6. Aalso discussed here are the 
Cotton Monopoly and Sugar Co-operatives. Finally in section 7, we discuss governance 
  1issues and required policy initiatives by way of capacity building that suggest the road 
ahead to usher in the growth process. We conclude in section 8. 
 
 
2. Assessing Maharashtra’s Growth Performance 
The state of Maharashtra, occupying 3.08 lakh sq. km i.e. approximately 9% of 
the territory of India, is home to 9.67 crore people, which constitutes 9.4% of India’s total 
population (2001 census). It is the second most populous state of India after Uttar 
Pradesh. Despite the fact that Maharashtra constitutes less than 10% of the total 
population of the country, it accounts for nearly one-fourth of the gross value of India's 
industrial sector. At current prices the per capita income (Net National Product at Factor 
cost) of Maharashtra stood at Rs.26,386 as compared to a national average of Rs.18,912 
in 2002-03. Such being the scale of Maharashtra’s contribution to the Indian economy, it 
has earned the reputation of being the ‘Power House of India’. Despite these facts and 
figures, which seems to suggest that Maharashtra is one of the more progressive states of 
the Indian federation, the World Bank has branded it as a state with “an impressive past 
but an uncertain future” (World Bank, 2002). Fiscal deterioration of Maharashtra is the 
prime reason for this view.   
A look at annual growth rates of GSDP (at 1993-94 prices) tells us that 
Maharashtra experienced a high real growth rate in 1995-96, when the secondary sector 
registered the highest growth rate. Since then a steady decline has been noticed. 
(Annexure A: Table A1). In terms of per capita GSDP (93-94 prices) Maharashtra has 
maintained its second rank (from amongst 15 non-special category states) since 1993/94 
with the happy exception of two years of 1997/98 and 1999/00 when it ranked first.  
The sectoral contributions of the three sectors reveal a very telling story. The 
contribution of the tertiary sector has risen and stands at 56% in 2002-03, that of 
secondary sector was 28% and that of primary sector was 15% (Annexure A: Table A1). 
Clearly, the secondary sector’s contribution to Maharashtra’s growth has been far from 
satisfactory with detrimental effect on its own taxable capacity. The general point to be 
made here is that, for any economy, service sector expansion without commensurate 
increase in other sectors is unsustainable. This lopsided development can only be self-
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a worrisome implication that the tax revenue potential is severely limited.   This is 
particularly noteworthy as Maharashtra is one of the most industrialized states. Clearly, 
any further impetus to growth in Maharashtra requires that an enabling environment be 
put in place for the secondary sector to perform to its potential.  
Two distinguishing characteristics of the economic growth in Maharashtra are its 
regionally skewed pattern and its dependence on the performance of Mumbai. The 
contribution of Mumbai alone to per capita GSDP has never fallen below 36% in the last 
ten years. The state of Maharashtra has never fallen below the 2
nd rank in case of per 
capita GSDP, but if we exclude Mumbai from Maharshtra, its rank slips to 3
rd in 1993-94, 
to 4
th between 1994-95 and 1998-99 and further to 5
th position in 2000-01 and 2001-02 
(Annexure A: Table A2).  
As a backdrop to any economic analysis of a state of the Indian federation, it is 
important to understand its demographic features. This is especially true of the state of 
Maharashtra where regional variations are sharp and where in-migration contributes 
significantly to population growth. The next section takes a quick look at demographic 
features and social attainment of Maharashtra. 
 
3. Demographic Status and Social Attainment of Maharashtra    
Census 2001 points out that from 1901 to 1961 i.e. in 60 years the state merely 
doubled its population but only within the last 40 years it has multiplied by 2.5 times. 
However, the decade of 1991-2001 has witnessed the lowest ever decadal growth rate of 
22.57% since 1961 and this is certainly a welcome sign. Undoubtedly it still lies above 
the national average of the decadal growth rate being 21.34% but clearly there has been 
some progress on this front.  
Regional variations in population size in the five divisions of the State have been 
tabulated (Table A3). That the coefficient of variation has risen from about 29% to 35% 
is indicative of regional variations having increased on the population front. The five 
largest districts in Maharashtra each with a population exceeding 4 million are from 
Western Mahrashtra. Mumbai, Thane, Pune, Nashik and Ahmadnagar occupy only 19% 
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Maharashtra state.  
A characteristic feature of Maharashtra’s demographic pattern is that in-migration 
contributes significantly to the increase in population of the state. With the 2001 census 
migration figures not yet available for Maharashtra, the Economic Survey (2003) has 
worked it out as the difference between actual and natural growth rates. The estimate so 
obtained shows that migration contributed as much as 23% to the population growth 
during 1991-2001. In other words one out of every five additions to Maharashtra’s 
population was a migrant. Statistics show that not only has migration contributed 
significantly to Maharshtra’s population, but that its contribution has further increased in 
the last decade. The contribution of migration to Maharshtra’s population over the last 
two decades has been tabulated in Table A4 
In addition to being the second most populous state, Maharashtra is also the 
second most urbanized state of India. The urban population of Maharashtra at 42.4% is 
one and a half times that of the national average of 27.78% as per the 2001 census. This 
figure emphasizes the fact that any analysis of Maharashtra requires that a special effort 
be made to analyse the issues and problems specific to the urban sector in Maharshtra. 
Further, it may be worth noting that as per the 2001 census, among the fifteen most 
populous agglomerations in India, Maharashtra alone has three with Brihanmumbai (1
st 
rank), Pune (8
th rank) and Nagpur (13
th rank). The strong trend towards urbanization and 
limited housing stock has led to the development of large slum areas. 2001 census reports 
that 10.6 million people reside in slums in Maharashtra, with 5.82 million in Mumbai city 
and suburbs alone.  An inter-state comparison of the percent of population residing in 
slums as per the 2001 population shows that of the 14 major states, Maharashtra ranks 
12
th i.e. it has the third largest proportion of slum population. (see Table A5)  
What is important to understand from these statistics is that growth in slum 
population of Maharashtra is – at least in part – a natural consequence of the large-scale 
in-migration that takes place into Maharashtra. The fact that Kerala is ranked first with 
only 1.81% of its population in slums is not necessarily suggestive of its having done 
remarkably well on the front of housing or welfare of the poor. Contrary to the state of 
Maharashtra, Kerala and many other states of India have people migrating away in search 
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population is inherent to a highly urbanized state like Maharashtra and it cannot be 
compared to others like Kerala in this respect. Another important offshoot of this is that 
by implication the social sector requirements of a state like Maharashtra are likely to be 
quite peculiar .In particular water-sanitation requirements as well as type of education 
required will need to be tailor made for specific situation. 
Obtaining the exact numbers of people below the poverty line has become a 
subject of research in its own right, and not something that we would like to delve into in 
this study. Hence we confine ourselves to the official estimates of poverty published by 
the Government of Maharashtra in its Economic Survey, which are listed in Table A6 
 Figures show that the percent of people below the poverty line has declined from 
53.24% in 73-74 to 36.86% in 93-94 and further to 25.02% in 1999-00. The poverty 
reduction rate for rural areas is seen to be higher than that for urban areas. While the 
above figures would suggest that significant strides have been made in poverty reduction 
in Maharashtra, the Economic Survey of Maharshtra (2003) points out that in relative 
terms Maharashtra has been outperformed by its contemporaries. Punjab and Haryana, 
which had the about the same per capita income during 1999-00, had a much lower 
incidence of poverty. Also, Karnataka and Kerala had the same level of the incidence of 
poverty in 1973/74, but in 1999/00 their poverty levels were much lower than that of 
Maharashtra. 1999/00 estimates show that of the 16 major states with more than 1 crore 
of population, 10 states had an incidence of poverty lower than that of Maharashtra. Thus 
Mahrashtra has undoubtedly improved on the poverty reduction front when compared to 
its own past but in relative terms it hasn’t done as well as some its counterparts. 
    On the education front, Maharashtra with a literacy rate of 77.3 per cent is 12 
percentage points above the all India level (65.38%). Maharashtra has shown a two fold 
increase from the 35.1% literacy rate in 1961. A 12.4 percentage point increase in the 
decade of 1991-2001 in literacy rate is the maximum decadal rise in the last four decades. 
In the year 2001 there were 27 districts with a literacy rate exceeding 60% as compared 
to only 7 in 1961. As compared to 1961 the enrolment in primary education has tripled, in 
secondary education it has increases ten fold and in higher education there is a 8.5 times 
increase. Hence, compared to its own past, Maharashtra has come a long way in 
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second amongst the 14 major states in 2001 on this count. 
However, the high dropout levels are disturbing. Data reveals that by Standard IV 
only 85 per cent of boys and 86 per cent of girls remain in school. These figures dip 
further for the higher classes and by Standard X only 47 per cent of boys and 40 per cent 
of girls remain in school. Another area that Maharashtra has not done well is the area of 
adult literacy. More than 80% of female agricultural labourers and more than 60% of 
women from landholding families are illiterate (Human Development Report: 
Maharashtra,2002).   
Another important point to take note of in this context is that simply looking at 
literacy rates is not a sufficient indicator in a highly urbanized state such as Maharashtra. 
A clear indicator to this is observed from the fact that if we look at slum literacy rates we 
will find them to be as high if not higher sometimes than the non-slum literacy rates. 
Slum literacy for Mumbai is seen to be as high as 80% as per 2001 census. This clearly 
suggests that success of the state on the education front needs to be looked at not only in 
terms of conventional indicators such as literacy rates, but in terms of the extent of 
vocationalisation that has occurred in the state. The number of vocational institutions and 
enrolments in such institutions are important as job oriented training is provided here. 
Here is an important policy initiative in waiting!    
Improvement in health profile, access to healthcare, and higher life expectancy 
are just as important indicators of human development. On two counts Maharashtra has 
done fairly well – reducing the infant mortality rate and raising life expectancy at birth. 
From 105 in 1971, the IMR declined to 48 per 1000 births in 1999 with a marginal 
differential between males and females. Though the overall gap is steadily closing the 
difference between the urban and rural levels remains a cause for concern. Life 
expectancy at birth is 67.7 years and 61.7 years for urban and rural males respectively, 
and it is 71.2 years and 63.9 years for urban and rural females respectively. This is due to 
improved access to healthcare and facilities like immunisation and nutrition. However, 
despite this improvement, the new challenge of HIV and AIDS constitutes one of the 
biggest hurdles for Maharashtra, which has among the highest incidence of this disease in 
India. HIV needs to be addressed as a regular development issue as its prevalence is 
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It represents a formidable task that needs focused efforts by clinics supplying blood, 
community education /awareness campaigns and family welfare bodies.  
There is a wide gap in the healthcare infrastructure available in the rural and 
urban areas. Public investment and health expenditure is not only inadequate but has 
declined since the 1990’s, lowering Maharashtra’s position vis-à-vis the other States of 
India. The private health sector in Maharashtra is the largest in the country and better 
developed, especially in Mumbai, but the issues of quality and minimum standards need 
to be addressed. As far as the public sector is concerned, the non-availability of doctors 
and medicines, lengthy bureaucratic procedures and inadequate medical staff add to the 
problems. More resources are required, therefore, in the public domain to achieve better 
reach and equity in health services with a special focus on women and childrens’ needs. 
Wide discrepancy in rural and urban Maharashtra are indicated in the statistics provided 
in the Human Development Report: Maharashtra, 2002 (Table A7). 
We find that there are 140 doctors in urban areas per lakh population while there 
are only 24 doctorss per lakh population in rural areas. Similar disparities are noticeable 
in case of hospitals, dispensaries, beds and nurses. Thus intra-state variation is a cause for 
concern on the health front in Maharashtra.  
The broad story that emerges out of the above analysis is that in terms of 
conventional socio-economic indicators there is no doubt that poverty eradication, 
education and health status have improved in the state of Maharashtra, but it would not be 
out of place to say that firstly, the performance in the social sector has certainly not 
matched growth performance of the State. Secondly, the wide disparities within the state, 
especially between rural and urban areas are a major cause for concern in the socio-
economic development of Maharashtra. The Human Development Report of Maharashtra 
observes that the benefits of growth have not been shared evenly across Maharashtra. It is 
common knowledge that growth is non-homothetic, but the State must step in and iron 
out the regional disparities to avoid potential socio-political strife that will endanger the 
very fruits of success. 
Having got a broad picture of the socio-economic development of Maharshtra, it 
would be pertinent to point out at this juncture that although direct links between the 
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econometric sense. Nonetheless, given that the government is a major provider of public 
health, education and physical infrastructure, problems in its delivery systems due to 
inadequate finances are bound to adversely impact the socio-economic indicators. Thus, 
having got an overall picture of the socio-economic development in Maharshtra, we 
proceed to a detailed discussion of the fiscal scenario in the state, which forms the major 
thrust of the present paper.  
The broad story that emerges from the above analysis is that in terms of 
conventional socio-economic indicators, there is no doubt that as far as poverty 
eradication, education and health status is concerned, there has been an improvement in 
the state of Maharashtra over time. In terms of conventional indicators its relative 
position is reasonably good but hasn’t improved on the education front (consistently 3
rd 
rank), but presents a mixed picture on the health side. However, as mentioned previously, 
for a highly urbanized state like Maharashtra, these conventional indicators are 
inadequate. The performance of Maharashtra in both, the education and the health sector 
must be deemed to have fallen short of the requirements. Also, wide intra-state disparity, 
between rural and urban areas, is a major cause for concern in the socio-economic 
development of Maharashtra. Clearly, there are lessons to be learnt both at the policy 
design level as well as macro fiscal initiatives that we will draw in a later section. 
 Given that the main thrust of this paper is to trace the fiscal health of the state of 
Maharashtra, we have attempted to link this performance of Maharashtra on education 
and health front with expenditure allocations on education and health later in the paper 
after getting a feel of the macro picture of Maharashtra’s fiscal performance.  
 
4. Assessing Maharashtra’s Fiscal Performace: The Macro Picture 
The time period chosen for analysis spans the period 1993-94 to 2002-03 (RE) for 
inter-state comparison and 1993-94 to 2003-04 (RE) for Maharashtra alone. The budget 
estimate of 2004-05 for relevant variables too has been noted alongside so as to be able to 
take a view about its credibility. The choice of the beginning of sample period from 
1993-94 can be justified on both, purely statistical and on economic grounds. From a 
purely statistical point of view the new GSDP begins from 1993-94 hence the chosen 
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view one could say that the decade of the 90s began with the major macroeconomic crisis 
for the Indian economy. After the initial turmoil and volatility it was only from 1993-94 
that the economy settled down.  
Most recent studies (see World Bank, 2002) have suggested that Maharashtra 
slipped on the fiscal front after 1995-96. In order to judge the areas and extent of this 
slippage, we analyze Maharashtra’s performance – as already noted – in two ways. First, 
we compare Maharashra’s performance vis-à-vis fourteen other major states of India
3. 
We then look at the trend performance of Maharashtra since 1993-94. We have used both 
RBI data on State Finances as well as Financial Statements of the Government of 
Maharashtra (GoM). The RBI data has been used when analyzing Maharashtra’s relative 
performance so as to get comparable estimates across states (available up to 02-03 RE) 
and the GoM data (available up to 2004-05 BE) has been used for the detailed analysis of 
Maharashtra’s fiscal performance. On account of definitional variations, the figures 
presented in budget documents of the GoM do not conform to those in the RBI 
documents. Hence some data adjustments have been made in order to obtain comparable 
series over the entire sample period. These adjustments made have been detailed in 
Annexure B of the paper.  
 
 
4 (A) Maharashtra’s Relative Performance  
To assess Maharashtra’s relative performance we sub-divide this entire period 
into three sub-periods: Period I representing the first half of the 1990s (1993-94 to 1995-
96); Period II reflects the period of so called ‘setback’ and spans the period 1996-97 to 
2003-04 (RE) and Period III is the most recent performance i.e. 2000-01 to 2003-04 
(RE). For each of these time periods we take simple averages of key macro fiscal 
indicators to assess the fiscal stress in the state and the improvement or deterioration of 
performance. This approach is advisedly simple, as given the data-size, it would be 
                                                           
3 The sample comprises of the same fifteen for which social attainment indicators were considered.  
In order to maintain consistency over time Bihar, MP and UP have been considered to be undivided. 
Specifically,  Bihar and Jharkhand, MP and Chattisgarh; U.P and Uttaranchal have been clubbed together 
for the years 2000/01 to 2002/03(RE). 
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statistics/econometrics.  
Six key indicators were identified by us (see table A8) to rank the fifteen states in 
each of the three periods mentioned below. The ranks have been given so that the best 
performing state in each of the cases has been awarded a rank of 1.  
The picture that emerges from the relevant table is that when GFD/GSDP is used, 
Maharshtra does not seem to be a poor performer in the latter half of the 90s in 
comparison with 14 major states of the Indian Union. The changing structure and 
composition of the deficit, however, is a cause for worry. The ratio of Revenue Deficits 
to GFD shows its rank to have slipped from 3
rd in period I to 6
th in period II and further to 
11
th in period III. Thus, fiscal deterioration has sharply increased in the years 200-01 to 
2002-03, at least in relative terms. When considering the budget, the ratio of capital 
disbursements to total expenditures the state, Maharashtra has slipped from its 3
rd 
position in period I, to 9
th in period II and even further to 13
th in period III. On the own 
tax revenue front as per cent of revenue expenditure (tax effort measure used by the 
EFC), the state was seen to be a star performer in a relative sense in the first half of the 
nineties. It has been over taken by Tamil Nadu in the latter half of the 90s in period II 
(slipped to 2
nd rank) and by Haryana and Tamil Nadu in period III (slipped to 3
rd rank). 
However, despite this relatively good tax effort, Maharashtra finds itself at the bottom of 
the table in the devolution of grants. Grants given by the Finance Commission and 
Planning Commission are criteria based and hence it is often pointed out in official 
circles that no state can be deliberately victimized. However, we believe that efficiency 
has not been given its due weight in the criteria used to devolve grants. It is our 
contention that there is no problem if Maharshtra receives nothing on some criteria, 
coming under the ‘need based’ category, but it must get its due share from the kitty on 
efficiency grounds (see Pethe and Lalvani, 2004).       
It has been be pointed out that the tax effort measure need not necessarily suggest 
efficiency as tax competition amongst states has led to large scale tax exporting and 
hence is not a precise efficiency measure
4. For Maharashtra specifically, Rao and Sen 
(1996) find that in 1987/88, tax exportation contributed as much as 43% of Maharashtra’s 
                                                           
4 We thank Dr. Govinda Rao for drawing attention to this point. 
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of not factoring in tax exportation. Even whilst keeping this caveat in mind, it continues 
to be our view that in the absence of any alternative measure that is simple, transparent 
and easily computable, this measure does serve its role as an indicative measure proxying 
efficiency in tax performance, especially in the incremental sense. This is especially so if 
tax exportation is temporally reasonably stable across states. Indeed, it needs hardly be 
mentioned that all indicators, especially ratios, suffer from some obvious limitations.  
Having used some macro fiscal indicators to compare Maharshtra’s fiscal 
performance to that of others, in the next sub-section we undertake a more detailed 
examination of the fiscal performance of Maharashtra since 1993-94. In other words the 
next sub-section attempts to assess Maharashtra’s performance vis-à-vis its own past. 
4(B) A Trend Pattern of Maharashtra’s Fiscal Performance:    
  This section of the study is structured in the following manner:  
(i)  We take a look at key deficit indicators, which show the extent of fiscal stress 
under which the economy finds itself.  
(ii)  Trace the cause of this stress i.e. whether it originates from the expenditure or 
the receipts side of the budget.  
(iii)  Attempt to see how the government of Maharashtra has been trying to fund 
the fiscal deficits i.e. we look at the debt profile of Maharashtra.     
   
  GFD/GSDP, Gross Fiscal Gap (GFG) and Primary Deficit to GSDP ratios, all 
indicators of fiscal stress, show a steady worsening in fiscal discipline. The extent of 
fiscal profligacy indulged in by any government is evident from revenue deficit. Only 
nine years ago i.e. in 1994-95 Maharashtra had registered a revenue surplus, but from 
then on the Revenue Deficit as a proportion of Gross Fiscal Deficit has risen rather 
sharply to reach 87% in 2000-01. The last two years show some improvement on this 
front but the ratio is still as high as 46% in 2003-04 (RE). The 2004-05(BE) shows this 
ratio to increase by 20 percentage points. This clearly signals that no major effort to pull 
back revenue deficits is in the offing. (Appendix A:Table A9) 
  The large increase in revenue expenditures has come at the expense of cuts in 
capital expenditures. We find a large increase in surpluses on capital account. Capital 
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GSDP in 2003-04. In nominal terms the capital surpluses have risen from Rs. 63 crores in 
1993-94 to reach almost Rs.10,000 crores in 2001-02. The last couple of years show 
some reduction on this front but it was still above Rs. 9000 crores in 2003-04(RE).  
Expenditure Pattern   
The broad story about the expenditure pattern of Maharashtra over the last ten 
years is that it is the crucial developmental expenditures that have been axed in case of 
both the revenue and capital account. The point that comes across very sharply from the 
above analysis of Maharashtra’s finances is that it is imperative that one looks at the fine 
print of budgets to know where exactly the burden of the adjustment falls. 
On the revenue expenditure side salaries, pensions and interest payments in a way 
represent ‘committed expenditure’ for the government. The share of these three in total 
revenue receipts constituted as much as 58% in 1993-94. This shot up to as much as 91% 
in 1999-00 on account of the Pay Commission revision. Since then there has been some 
effort to curb these expenditures but it continued to siphon off as much as 81% in 2001-
02. The RE for 2003-04, which still is a mid-term figure, puts it at 74%. The budget 
estimate for 2004-05 puts it at 70% i.e. 4 percentage points lower than the RE of the 
previous year. While the debt swap scheme does offer some scope for reduction of 
interest payments, with elections round the corner and budget announcements like D.A. 
hike by 6%  in the 2004-05 budget this target does not appear credible.  
Delving a little further into details, in the (sub)sub-section that follows we take a 
closer look at specific expenditure heads of education and health and try to tell a story 
that relates the attainment indicators observed for education and health in section 2 above 
with expenditure allocations in these two sectors. 
Expenditure Allocations for Education and Health 
  Earlier in the paper, we looked at a conventional measure of educational 
attainment viz., literacy.  We are well aware that this measure of performance is only 
indicative, as a study of attainment in the education sector is in itself the subject matter of 
a large body of research. Be that as it may, looking at it from ‘above’, we find that the 
state has fared reasonably well temporally and also fared reasonably well among fifteen 
major states (3
rd Rank). The financial side of this story is that in per capita terms the 
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spike in 1999-00 and 2000-01. This is clearly on account of the Pay Commission award. 
However, per capita education expenditure on capital account shows a distinctly 
downward trend since 1999-00. If we consider the share of education in revenue 
expenditures, we find the shares to be fairly consistent till 1999-00, when there was a 
sharp rise in the share of education expenditures on revenue account. However, this has 
been seen to revert to its earlier level in the last two years. Since this very year the share 
of education in capital expenditure has been severely cut. Thus increasing expenditure 
allocations to education in per capita terms appear to be reflected in improved attainment 
till 2001 (the year for which latest attainment indicators are available).  
In the health sector too attainment indicators suggest temporal improvement in 
conventional attainment indicators like IMR and Death rate (discussion in Section 3 
above). On the fiscal side we find that health expenditure, both on revenue and on capital 
account, have shown a steady increase in per capita terms over the ten-year period under 
consideration. In terms of shares, however, we find a steadily declining trend in the share 
of health expenditures on revenue account in total revenue expenditures but an increase 
in the share of health expenditure on capital account in total capital expenditures. A 
political economy explanation – that in a sense is generic – that one could possibly 
venture to provide for this result is that opening up of new public health center’s (PHCs) 
and community health center’s (CHCs) seem to be ‘politically attractive’ to incumbents 
to appease voters, but maintenance expenditures which are crucial for functioning of 
these PHCs/CHCs have been pulled back.   
Increasing social sector expenditures in per capita terms especially in revenue 
expenditures leads us to the conclusion that there does not appear to be any disconnect 
between expenditures allocations for social sector and social sector attainment. 
However, the low and declining share of education and health in revenue expenditures 
clearly show that social sectors have not significantly contributed to the overall fiscal 
stress that the state finds itself in.  
To continue in this vein further, we once again draw on the previous discussion 
on social sector attainment, where we pointed out a highly urbanized state like 
Maharashtra needs to focus on issues such as vocationalisation of education and problems 
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divide between rural and urban sectors on a priority basis. Undoubtedly, all these are 
extremely important issues, but they are matters of micro level design and cannot be 
addressed in a paper such as this, which attempts to provide the macro picture. However, 
these observations lead us to the policy prescription that we need a re-adjustment of 
existing resources. These re-adjustments are needed at all levels – from non-
developmental to developmental, specifically towards social sector and even within 
specific category of education and health expenditures we need a re-adjustment of 
resources to address specific areas of concern. A better balance needs to be achieved 
between revenue and capital expenditures. The challenge lies in achieving this whilst not 
allowing the macro-aggregates in fiscal/budgetary balance getting out of control. 
For tackling the existing problems and for gearing up to face future challenges, 
policies directed towards re-adjusting of existing resources must be coupled with those 
which increase the size of the pie itself. This brings us to the receipts side of the story. 
Revenue Receipts  
A measure of the efficiency in the government’s functioning is gauged from the 
trend pattern of own tax and own non-tax revenues (as mentioned previously, own tax 
revenues do suffer from the limitation of not factoring in tax exportation by states). The 
share of own non-tax revenues from economic services has, however, dipped from 45% 
in 93-94 to a low of 28% in 2001-02. It has improved to about 46% in the RE of 2003-04 
but is expected to fall to 38% as per the budget estimate of 2004-05. This fall in non-tax 
revenues from economic services is indicative of subsidization of these services.  
The share of own tax revenues in revenue expenditure, the measure of tax effort 
used by the EFC shows the maximum to have been reached in 1994-95 and 1995-96. The 
measure has shown some reduction in the second half of the 90s and reached its 
minimum in 2000-01. However, an increasing trend is noticeable since then. The 
buoyancies for some of the important taxes have been computed. Our estimates show that 
sales tax, the most important contributor to state government treasury, contributing 
approximately 60% of the state’s own tax revenue, has a buoyancy which is lower than 
stamps and registration duty, electricity duty, taxes on vehicles and even land revenue. 
Multiple rates have made the sales tax structure complicated resulting in loopholes, 
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in this source of tax revenue not contributing to a greater extent to the exchequer 
(Annexure A: Tables A13 and A14). Tax revenues can increase either by increasing tax 
rates or a widening of the tax base. The process of tinkering around with tax rates seem to 
have tapered off, hence a widening of the tax base must be actively explored coupled 
with improvements in tax administration to plug loopholes. A move towards VAT 
incentivizes correct reporting and, given the predominance of the service sector in 
Maharashtra, getting more services into the tax net. These are two measures, which are 
sure to cause the revenue receipts of the GoM to move to a higher trajectory. Both these 
decisions are politically difficult and dependent on the decisions at the central 
government. Although, technically, the state can introduce VAT within its boundaries
5, 
for it to be successful, a nation-wide VAT would need to be put in place. 
Yet another reason why the state of Maharashtra needs to look towards the center 
for improving its fiscal health is the design of intergovernmental transfers. The share of 
grants from the center in revenue receipts has declined from 11% in 1993-94 to reach its 
lowest of 5% in 1998-99. Subsequently there has been some increase but it stood at about 
8% in 2003-04(RE) (Annexure A: Table A13). Here we would like to reiterate the point 
made in the previous section about increased weight being accorded to the efficiency 
criterion. In a previous study we have suggested a set of principles (FAIR PLAN 
approach) that should guide the devolution by Twelfth Central Finance Commission (see 
Pethe and Lalvani 2004a). What it urges in the main is to have an element of incentive 
compatibility in the devolution process. Such a move is mandated by the emerging 
context of party (coalitional) politics and the reality of different political interests at the 
Center and the Sate. As a logical corollary it follows that a similar scheme must prevail 
when it comes to the transfer from the State to Local Bodies (see Karnik et al 2001). The 
Fiscal Reform Facility of the Eleventh Finance Commission, which has instituted an 
incentive fund is a positive move in this direction. However, the package of rewards and 
penalties (incentive compatibility) needs to be instituted in the devolution criteria. Thus, 
                                                           
5 Maharashtra did experiment with a subtraction type VAT between 1995-99 but the experiment did not 
succeed.   
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between various levels of governments. 
Thus the story from the receipts side of the budget is that Maharashtra has fared 
reasonably well on the tax front. However, there is scope for improvement. For 
substantial improvements to occur some measures could be adopted at the level of state 
government itself, but for others it must depend on a comprehensive package including 
reform measures at the level of the central government. Improvement at the level of the 
state government can occur by reducing exemptions and improving administration in 
case of taxes such as sales tax. For additional improvements such as bringing in more 
services into the tax net and implementation of VAT the initiative needs to come from the 
central government. (This has happened since we wrote this piece and the jury is out on 
its success).  
 Since resources raised thus far have fallen far short of expenditure needs, the 
state has been compelled to borrow. Unlike the individual level, borrowing at the level of 
governments is not necessarily a vice. The use to which these borrowings are put is 
crucial. Given the large scale borrowings resorted by all state governments, questions of 
debt sustainability have once again come to the fore. While the rule of thumb measure of 
debt to GDP ratio exceeding the interest rate can be used to get a feel for its 
sustainability, to our mind a careful analysis of the structure and composition of debt 
assumes greater importance from the point of view of debt restructuring.     
Debt Position and Composition 
  The GoM defines total debt as having three components viz., (i) Public Debt i.e. 
internal debt and loans from central government (ii) Borrowings from small savings and 
provident fund and (iii) other interest bearing obligations i.e. from reserve fund and 
deposits and advances. Total debt of the state of Maharashtra as per cent of GSDP has 
gone up from 14% to 25% in 2004-05(RE) i.e. an increase of 11 percentage points 
(Annexure A: Table A15). In nominal terms the expenditure on interest payments has 
increased over five times. The share of loans and advances constituted as much as 88% in 
93-94. This share reduced but continued to stay as high as 81% till 2001-02. On account 
of the debt swap scheme the share of loans from centre has declined to reach 51% in 
2003-04 (RE) (Annexure A: Table A15). 
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of extra-budgetary operations. Many PSUs in Maharashtra have raised money in the 
domestic capital market backed by unconditional and irrevocable guarantees by the GoM. 
These borrowings do not need to figure in the budget as they do not need the approval of 
the state legislature. These operations constitute (i) off-budget borrowings through the 
creation of new public corporations called Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs). These are 
serviced through the budget. Borrowings through SPVs provide an easy way to bypass 
the GOI restriction placed on state government borrowings via Article 293, Clause (3)
6 
and (ii) guarantees or contingent liabilities which are serviced by the borrowing agencies. 
While off budget borrowings have been a feature of Maharashtra’s finances only since 
1996/97, it has been issuing guarantees on extra-budgetary borrowings since the 1980s. 
During the period 1996-97 to 2003-04 (RE) the stock of off-budget borrowings has 
shown a fifteen fold increase. The amount outstanding by way of guarantees has 
increased seven fold between 1996-97 and 2001-02 (Annexure A: Table A16).   
A point that we would like to make at this juncture is that off-budget borrowings, 
while ‘gimmicky’ and used as an instrument for circumventing government restrictions, 
cannot in a logical sense be deemed to be necessarily wasteful as they are borrowings for 
infrastructure projects. Like all other forms of borrowing the use to which these funds are 
put, the returns from those projects vis-à-vis the cost of these borrowings however, will 
determine its viability. In Maharashtra’s case most of the funds borrowed via SPVs have 
gone into irrigation projects and have not been have not utilized appropriately
7. However, 
if infrastructure funding is not to suffer, alternative sources/strategies of funding these 
projects need to be explored. One such alternative is the public-private partnership where 
the government acts as a provider of seed money and /or enabling regulatory 
environment. The other alternative that could be explored is the access of local bodies to 
capital markets via municipal bonds. The experience thus far shows that only bigger 
municipal corporations are in a position to take the advantage of the resources available 
                                                           
6 Article 293 Clause (3) of the Indian Constitution states that “A state may not without the consent of the 
GOI raise any loan if there is still outstanding any part of the loan which has been made to the GOI or by its 
predecessor government, or in respect of which a guarantee has been given by the GOI or by its 
predecessor government”. 
7 We would like to thank the Finance Secretary of Maharashtra, Ms. Chitkala Zutshi for drawing attention 
to this.   
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financial position and lack of capacity to prepare viable project proposals. Some 
suggestions that will enable small and medium local bodies to access the capital market 
have been provided in Pethe and Lalvani (2004b). 
While there is no denying that the fiscal health of Maharashtra is far from 
enviable and has deteriorated significantly over the last decade, it would be unfair not to 
credit the government of Maharashtra (bureaucracy included) for recognizing the 
problems and putting it down in the form of reports and documents. In October 1999 a 
White Paper on the State's finances was presented and discussed in the State Legislature. 
The National Institute of Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP) was engaged to do a study 
of state finances and it submitted its final report in September 2001. A one-man 
committee was then appointed to suggest ways to improve the transparency in budgetary 
processes (Godbole July 2001). Under the States’ Fiscal Reform Facility the GoM drew 
up the Medium Term Fiscal Reform Programme for Maharashtra. Like 14 other states the 
GoM too signed an MOU with the central government. However, the fact that the MOU 
and the MTFRP document have not been put on the public domain defeats the very 
purpose of any such reform initiative. If reform commitments are to be institutionalized 
then it must be made mandatory that such documents be put in public domain. Such 
publicly made commitments have a greater chance of tying the hands of political parties 
and ushering in accountability on the part of governments.  
5. Assessing Maharashtra’s Performance during MTFRP period: 2000-01 to 2003-
04 (RE):  
Since the origins of the MTFRP goes back to the EFC and also since the MTFRP 
document of the GoM was not available in public domain we have chosen to assess 
Maharashtra’s performance on some key parameters in the ‘reform’ scenario vis-à-vis the 
‘base’ or ‘no-reform’ projections for all states  made by the Eleventh Finance 
Commission (EFC) and also vis-à-vis the actual performance of all states other than 
Maharashtra (this refers to the aggregate of all 28 states). The performance of all states 
could be traced only up to 2002-03 (RE) as the RBI State Finances make inter-state 
comparisons possible only till this data point. The ‘no-reform’ and ‘reform’ graphs are as 
projected by the EFC of GFD/GSDP is shown below. We find that Maharashtra started 
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worse than even the no-reform scenario. 















Maharshtra shows up in poor light as far as the ratio of revenue deficits to GSDP 
is concerned. The state was worse than the no-reform projection and the performance of 
all states in the beginning stages. Some improvement on this front, however, is noticeable 
in 2003-04 (RE) where it is better than the no-reform projection but way off target from 


















Delving a little further into the structure of revenue deficit we find that revenue 
expenditures as per cent of GSDP has shown a steady reduction. In 2002-03 its 
performance has shown an improvement. It has bettered the collective performance of 
other states and the non-reform projections. This improvement, however, must be 
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expenditures in detail. The observation made was that it is the ‘developmental’ category 
of expenditure has been axed. This finding serves to draw attention to the potential 
danger of target setting without charting out the road map for attaining these targets. In 
the context of this lacunae in the FRBM. Karnik (2002) observes that in the absence of 
any checks and balances along a well defined path, our politicians would be sure to try 
and attain the goal of deficit reduction by axing the politically convenient expenditures 






























  Having taken stock of the expenditure performance we proceed to examining the 
receipts side of the budget. Maharashtra’s performance on the own tax front has been 
substantially better than even the reform projections of the EFC .  
 














  On the front of own non-tax revenues, Maharashtra’s performance was 
substantially better than that of other states and the reform projections of EFC. However, 
there has been a steady decline on the performance on this front. The ratio of non-tax 
revenue to GSDP, however, the ratio for Maharashtra declined to come to par with the 
combined performance of other states in 2002-03. The revised estimate for 2003-04 
shows it to have slipped even further to almost reach the non-reform projection.  
 
 






















The overall impression is that while Maharashtra’s performance has bettered the 
reform projections made by the EFC, on the revenue front, it has fallen short of the target 
on the expenditure front. The more detailed analysis of the previous sections reveal that 
structure of the deficit and the direction of expenditure pruning that has occurred is a 
cause for concern. Some of the welcome reform initiatives that have been initiated 
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Bills (SRB) in the Assembly.  
Moving a step forward from the macro picture of the fiscal scenario of 
Maharashtra, if we were to identify one specific sector, which has added significantly to 
fiscal woes of Maharashtra, the prime accused is the ‘Power Sector’. The section that 
follows provides a somewhat more detailed discussion of sectoral issues, specifically the 
power sector and the cotton and sugar markets.  
6. Sectoral Issues 
6(A) Power Sector in Maharashtra 
Maharashtra has the highest installed capacity, both private and public, and the 
largest market among the Indian States. Three power utilities, TATA Electric Company, 
Bombay Suburban Electric Supply (BSES) and Bombay Electric Supply & Transport 
(BEST) serve the Mumbai area. The first two are private, and the third one is 
municipality-owned but operates with considerable autonomy. Outside Mumbai, the 
Maharashtra State Electricity Board (MSEB) – a public body created under the Electric 
Supply Act (1948) of the Government of India – is the sole supplier of power in 
Maharashtra.  
Until 1999-2000, MSEB's financial performance was guaranteed by the state. In 
August 1999 Maharashtra Electricity Regulatory Commission (MERC) was established 
and has become effective since 2000-01. It sets electricity tariffs based on tariff filings 
submitted by MSEB. This has resulted in MSEB’s financial and other data becoming 
public and subject to considerable scrutiny. MERC has set strict performance targets for 
MSEB and has issued tariff orders predicated on efficiency improvements together with 
tariff adjustments such that the state will no longer have to subsidise the utility. MSEB 
required a manageable subsidy of Rs 300-650 crore until 1998-99. Since 1999-00 when 
Dhabol came into existence MSEB has become a loss making enterprise without subsidy. 
The net loss without subsidy was to the tune of Rs. 1149 crores for the year 2000-01. The 
budgetary support to the power sector which constitutes (i) subsidy and (ii) capital outlay 
and net lending has risen from Rs. 450 crores in 1993/94 to Rs. 1122 crores in 2003-04 
(RE) i.e. an increase of 2.5 times (Annexure A: Table A17). The point about the Dahbol 
episode is that while it may be considered an isolated instance that did not come off, the 
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to financial losses to the state economy, and the consequent loss of face vis-à-vis foreign 
investors, it will be a while before such a momentous initiative will be conceptualised 
again let alone actually taken. 
The power sector in Maharashtra, as in many other parts of the country, has been 
characterized by a total lack of commercial orientation. Tariffs for domestic and 
agricultural segments are lower than the average cost of supply of power, and are cross-
subsidized by the commercial, industrial and the railway traction consumers. It can be 
seen that even though the average cost of generating electricity is 357.54 Ps. per unit, the 
average realisation is only 270.02 Ps. per unit i.e a loss of 87.52 Ps. per unit.   
Table A18 shows that even though the agricultural/irrigation sector consumed 
about 25% of the total electricity sales it only contributed only a dismal 7.7% of the total 
revenues. The distorted tariff structure has led to an increase in high-paying industrial 
consumers setting up their own generating stations which currently have generating 
capacity of about 641 MW. In addition, NOCs for an additional 1181 MW captive 
capacity have been given. While consumption of power from the MSEB grid by high-
paying industrial consumers has been on the decline, consumption by subsidized 
consumer categories has grown over the past few years. Further, the low tariff for 
subsidized consumers has not only led to lower revenues, but also to sub-optimal 
consumption from these consumers (GoM’s white paper on Maharashtra Power Sector 
Reforms). The T&D losses are high at about 39.4%.  
Despite the problems confronting MSEB, a study done in 2002 by the Department 
of Power, GOI, of various electricity boards and electricity departments where scores 
were given according to the several factors that they listed out, Maharashtra was ranked 
5
th . Here the point that we wish to make is that despite the fact that the MSEB is not 
performing so badly in relative terms there is no room for complacency. Maharashtra is a 
highly industrialized state and its performance hinges crucially on the power sector, 
hence problems confronting this sector are likely to affect the economic well being of the 
state of Maharashtra to a greater extent than would be felt in other less industrialized 
states of India.  
  23The new Electricity Act 2003 has come into force from June 2003. An important 
aspect of the Act is that the provisions related to subsidies and cross-subsidies are well 
spelt out
8.  It clearly states that if the state government requires any specific category of 
consumers, such as farmers, be given a subsidy then the subsidy amount should be paid 
in  advance to MSEB in the manner as specified by MERC. However, the new 
government has asked for the Act to be reviewed, hence a sense of uncertainty prevails. 
Speedy action in this context is called for, as it must be recognized that problems 
confronting the power sector are huge and there are no quick fixes. The White Paper on 
power sector reforms makes it clear that the GoM recognizes the significance and the 
urgency of undertaking reforms in this sector on a priority basis. 
6(B) Fiscal Implication of Interventions in Cotton and Sugar Markets 
   The populist Cotton Monopoly Scheme of the Government of Maharashtra is only 
too well known. The Maharashtra State Marketing Federation operated the scheme as the 
chief government agent till 1984, when it was taken over by the Maharashtra State Co-
operative Cotton Growers Federation Ltd. The scheme made profits for ten years. Since 
1994-95 the two factors that have contributed to its downfall are falling market prices and 
rising minimum support price. In the year 1994-95 the total cost rose by 40%, of which 
70% was due to higher procurement price. The accumulated losses of the Federation in 
2000-01 were nearly Rs. 28,000 crores. This scheme has resulted in benefiting financial 
institutions and intermediary traders rather than the cotton farmers (World Bank, 2002).  
  Sugar Co-operatives are the other major problem that has added to the financial 
burden on the state exchequer. The rationale behind government support to sugar co-
operatives was to promote rural development. However, a majority of sugar co-operative 
mills in Mahrashtra are sick. This is a consequence of a lack of proper cost-benefit 
analysis before setting up of the mill. The proliferation of new mills has resulted in 
underutilization of existing ones. The outstanding stock of guaranteed loans at the end of 
the year 2000 was Rs.3300 crores. Given the sickness of a large number of sugar 
                                                           
8 “If the State Government requires the grant of any subsidy to any consumer or class of consumers in the tariff determined by the 
State Commission under section 62, the State Government shall, notwithstanding any direction which may be given under section 108, 
pay, within in advance in the manner as may be specified, by the State Commission the amount to compensate the person affected by 
the grant of subsidy in the manner the State Commission may direct, as a condition for the license or any other person concerned to 
implement the subsidy provided for by the State Government. Provided that no such direction of the State Government shall be 
operative if the payment is not made in accordance with the provisions contained in this section and the tariff fixed by State 
Commission shall be applicable from the date of issue of orders by the Commission in this regard”. 
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worsen the existing precarious fiscal health of the state.  In the 2004-05 budget the 
Government has given default guarantee to the 51 co-operative sugar factories 
pre-seasonal loan amounting to Rs. 39.57 crore during the crushing season 2003-2004 
and also gave guarantee for the working capital term loan of Rs. 786.50 crore to 31 co-
operative sugar factories. This measure is sure to add to the already strained fiscal health 
of the state. But given the political economy considerations in general, reforms in this 
arena are fraught with difficulties.   
After all the financial and fiscal data and ratios are computed and lacunae are 
identified, policy initiatives need to be suggested and taken. These cannot be 
operationalised in a vacuum. The framework of policy regimen is constructed through 
principles of governance. This forms the subject matter of discussion in the section that 
follows. 
7.  Governance Issues 
  Governance is a generic term. It has to do with the strategies that deal with 
identification of the lacunae and operational policy initiatives to be undertaken given the 
objectives of the government in order to infuse greater efficiency, transparency and 
accountability in its processes. The framework of strategic regimen is constructed 
through principles of governance. Given the objectives of the government, ‘good 
governance’ is concerned with systemic design that leads to better and efficient practices 
being adopted by administrative machinery – in some sense divorced (sanitized) from 
partisan political considerations – in the conduct of governmental policies. In a country 
like India, it is essential that polity, bureaucracy, private sector and civil society forge 
synergistic relations in order to create an environment conducive to good governance. 
  One of the chief concerns in this area is denoted by the umbrella term of capacity 
building. This term has several connotations. The change in the macroeconomic ethos has 
implied that state level policy design and implementation have to be carried out in a 
different manner. The best management practices need to be borrowed from private 
sector and inculcated by the state government machinery even in the highest echelons. 
Implementation at times will be seriously impinging on the vested interests of groups in 
the society and will require tact and political will to see such a transformation through. 
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schools like the YASHADA. Similar capacity needs to be built in accessing capital 
markets or taking bank exposure or indeed designing the enabling regulatory framework 
thereof. This requires considerable economic skills, something that many a public servant 
will need to work at building the capacity for. Design of specific courses for government 
employees is a task that requires urgent attention. 
At a higher level of governance (perhaps even at the political level) serious 
attention has to be paid to creating an incentive compatible structure in government 
service from top to bottom. In-service training and recognition of achievement through 
monetary and other compensation needs to be institutionalized. Thus, the public servants 
must perceive themselves as stakeholders in the process of governance. It is clear that 
service conditions have to be adjusted to be in tune with the changing times. This is 
clearly recognized but nothing concrete has yet emerged in the state of Maharashtra.  
Allied considerations have to be given to the question of political interference. In 
particular, transfers have to be rational and transparent, so that they sub-serve the goal of 
enhancing systemic efficiency rather than being an instrument of petty political vendetta. 
Maharashtra has taken some steps in this regard. The administrative reforms commission 
headed by Shri. Sukhtankar, and the Godbole committee report have taken pains to focus 
on this very aspect (of non-transparency and arbitrary transfer process). The reports are 
comprehensive and have been accepted and much appreciated but nothing really has 
moved on the ground. The trick here – the crucial next step – is to have in place a 
mandatory requirement on part of whichever government is in place to follow certain 
procedures that would stop ‘politicization’ and consequent emasculation of bureaucracy. 
Perhaps the time has come to have a fresh look at the role of the state in the 
present circumstances and redefine it. Apart from recognizing the difference between the 
traditional role of government to the more modern – enabling role –delimited and well-
defined multi-level hierarchical structure with obvious technology application in terms of 
e-governance, it must be recognized that the older regime has been carrying considerable 
extra baggage for too long. The time has come to trim down the responsibilities of the 
state and focus on catering to bare socially essential services. This will serve two 
purposes, one, the financial provisioning will come down and two, the quality of services 
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the quality of service delivery in an accountable way.  Thus, what we are stressing here is 
the need to build a conducive and enabling environment that will accept changes in the 
institutional settings. There is an obvious scope for considerable capacity building here. 
The initiative here has to come from the ‘political process’ perhaps with help from civil 
society, because the perception of both the politicians as well as the bureaucracy will be 
that they will lose the domain of influence both in extent and magnitude. 
Thus, governance issues emerge at various levels and should be dealt with as 
such. These involve training of staff in specific skills apart from procedures and 
protocols, the changes in service conditions so that incentive compatible system is in 
place. There are changes required at the level at policy and regulation to keep in step with 
the changing environment. Finally, there is need to bring about a change in the 
institutional substructures and their interaction modes not to mention involvement of 
expert external agencies. All this requires a massive capacity building exercise requiring 
a change in mindsets, creation of a feeling on the part of all the agents of being real 
stakeholders with the end result of improved governance. 
8. Conclusion 
Now the unenviable task of concluding this somewhat long paper must be faced. 
We have provided a backdrop of the state of Maharashtra in its various economic facets. 
We have then zeroed in on the fiscal situation and performance both in the relative (to 
other states) as well as the temporal (stand alone) aspects. In doing this we have gone into 
the structural details in order to gain insights and policy implications for improvements. 
Apart from illustrative treatment of Power sector – in some sense the pons asinorum – for 
Maharashtra’s progress, we have also dealt briefly with governance issues. The paper 
points to many specific problems and contains some specific suggestions that we briefly 
recapitulate. 
•  The role of the State and its areas of intervention must be delimited and well 
defined. 
•  An enabling environment must be put in place for the secondary sector, which is 
currently lagging behind, to perform to its potential. 
•  Policy initiatives must address the question of regional imbalance.  
•  With 42% of the population residing in urban areas, special effort must be made 
to analyze the issues and problems specific to the urban sector in Maharashtra. 
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•  Serious consideration must be given to rectify the structural lacunae in the 
budget. 
•  Intra-state variation is a cause for concern on the health front and needs to be 
addressed. 
•  Improvement on the expenditure side of the budget requires a re-adjusting of 
existing resources, coupled with policies directed towards increasing the size of 
the pie itself.  
•  Improvement on the receipts side requires a reduction in exemptions and an 
improvement in tax administration. Additional improvements such as bringing in 
more services into the tax net and implementation of VAT where the initiative 
needs to come from the centre.  
•  Mechanisms – such as legislative changes and the pooled fund approach – for 
smaller and medium municipalities to access the capital market must be designed.  
•  If reform commitments are to be institutionalized then it must be made mandatory 
that  relevant documents be put on public domain. Such publicly made 
commitments have a greater chance of tying the hands of political parties and 
ushering in accountability on the part of governments.  
•  A more meaningful and a mandated/statutory interaction between various levels 
of governments must emerge. 
•  Finally, for effective service delivery to happen, capacity building and 
governance issues must be tackled at all levels of government. 
 
  The policy suggestions – the solution set if you like – can be partitioned into three 
types of policies. One that deals with what the state can do on its own. The other that 
deals with what needs to be done by the Central government to create an enabling 
environment. And the third that deals with governance issues. The first type requires 
policies to be implemented by the state have to do with financial matters in the main but 
also deal with creation of meaningful and viable substructures. They also are concerned 
with having a properly worked out implementation mechanisms/ schemes. The second 
type deal with policies that the central government must pursue in its dealing with the 
states. The third type are overarching in a sense that they concern the governments at all 
levels and have to do with capacity building as well as having pragmatic regulatory 
frameworks in place. 
  The political space throws up many contradictions and compulsions so that 
techno-economic feasibility is never sufficient. Yet our hope lies in the fact that through 
all this muddle, politics continues to be an art of the possible! 
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  29Annexure A 
 
TABLE A1 
Gross State Domestic Product 1993/94 prices 
                                   (%) 
 
Annual Growth Rates 
 
Sectoral Contribution 
(As per cent of GSDP) 
Year GSDP  Primary Secondary Tertiary  Primary Secondary Tertiary 
1993-94 -  -  -  -  20.16  32.77  47.07 
1994-95 2.55  -1.37  2.34  4.38  19.39  32.70  47.91 
1995-96  11.49 4.81 15.43 11.51 18.23 33.86 47.91 
1996-97 5.08  15.58  4.59  1.43  20.05  33.70  46.25 
1997-98 5.56  -12.97 11.85  9.02  16.53  35.71  47.76 
1998-99 2.92  4.84  -4.17  7.56  16.84  33.24  49.92 
1999-2000  9.76  9.01  6.14 12.42 16.72 32.15 51.13 
2000-2001 -3.75  -4.15  -12.63  1.96  16.66  29.18  54.16 
2001-2002 5.17  5.14  1.33  7.25  16.65  28.12  55.23 
2002-2003 6.13  -1.70  6.36  8.37  15.42  28.18  56.40 
Source: Economic Survey of Maharashtra, various issues 
 
TABLE A2 
Regional Variation in District Domestic Product 
 
Relative Contribution to 
Per Capita Gross 
District Domestic 
Product (93-94 prices) 
Relative Rank of Maharashtra 
among 14 states based on Per 
















1993-94  36.51 74.77  50.78  2  3 
1994-95 36.13 75.82  50.70  2  4 
1995-96 36.46 76.70  51.80  1  4 
1996-97 36.06 78.19  49.04  2  4 
1997-98 38.82 78.23  56.25  2  4 
1998-99 37.50 76.94  53.15  2  4 
1999-2000 37.92  78.16  51.00  1  4 
2000-2001 37.79  78.20  51.10  2  5 
2001-2002 37.70  78.18  50.66  2  5 







  30TABLE A3 
Population (Division-Wise) 
                            (in lakhs) 
  1971 1981  1991  2001 
Konkan  116  152 194 248 
Pune  107  131 164 200 
Nashik  84  104 129 158 
Aurangabad 81  97  128  156 
Nagpur 52  74  90  107 
Amravati 65  69  84  99 
MEAN  84.17 104.5  131.5  161.33 
COFF. OF VAR.  28.84 30.88  32.19  34.94 
 
TABLE A4 
Contribution of Net Migration to Population Growth in Maharashtra  
(%) 
 Annual  Net 
migration rate 
Net Migration as per 
cent of population 
growth 
Estimated Net Migrants per year 
(million) 
1981-1991 0.23  10.0  0.16 
1991-2001 0.39  19.1  0.34 
Source: Maharashtra Human Development Report, 2002. 
Based on the difference between crude birth and death rates from Sample Registration System data 
 
TABLE A5 




% OF SLUM POPULATION
 
RANK 
Kerala 1.81  1 
Bihar 10.53  2 
Karnataka 11.50  3 
Gujarat 11.79  4 
Rajasthan 16.18  5 
Tamil Nadu  17.85  6 
Punjab 20.38  7 
Uttar Pradesh  22.12  8 
Orissa 22.54  9 
Madhya Pradesh  24.31  10 
West Bengal  26.82  11 
Maharashtra 31.66  12 
Andhra Pradesh  32.69  13 
Haryana 33.07  14 
INDIA 22.59    
Source: Census 2001 
  31TABLE A6 
Incidence of Poverty in Maharashtra 
(%) 
  1973-74 1993-94 1999-00 
Rural  57.71 37.93 23.72 
Urban  43.87 35.15 26.81 
Total  53.24 36.86 25.02 




Availability of Medical Care Facilities 
  No. Per 1,00,000 population 
  TOTAL RURAL  URBAN 
Allopathic hosp (1995)  5.9  1.0  13.2 
Allopathic Dispensaries (1995)  9.9  2.6  21.3 
Beds(1995) 153.9  44.7  324.7 
Doctors-allopathic (2000)  72.5  23.7  139.8 
Nurses (2000)  140.5  65.4  244.3 
Source: Maharashtra Human Development Report, 2002 
 
TABLE A8  
Relative Rank of Maharashtra 
 Ranks* 
 93/94-95/96  96/97-02/03  00/01-02/03 
   Period I  Period II  Period III 
Gross Fiscal Deficit / GSDP  3 3  4 
Revenue Deficit / GFD  4 6  12 
Revenue Expenditure / Rev. Receipts  3 6  7 
Capital Disbursements / Total Exp.  3 10  14 
Own tax / Rev. Exp.  1 2  3 
Grants / Rev. Rec.  13 15  15 
*Note:  Rows 1, 2 and 3 smallest ratio has been given a rank of 1. In Rows 4, 5 and 6, the 
largest ratio has been given a rank of 1 
 
 
  32TABLE A9 
Measures of Fiscal Imbalance       
(%) 






















as % of 
GSDP 
1993 - 94  2.00 2.64 0.67 5.38  -0.06 
1994 - 95  2.20 3.80 0.85 -9.69 -0.25 
1995 - 96  2.63 3.05 1.33 14.67 -0.51 
1996 - 97  2.76 3.21 1.40 32.11 -0.80 
1997 - 98  3.32 3.79 1.82 40.05 -1.45 
1998 - 99  3.49 4.01 1.77 52.61 -2.19 
1999 - 00  4.81 5.34 2.81 36.47 -1.02 
2000 - 01  3.76 5.29 1.57 87.28 -3.39 
2001 - 02  4.12 4.68 1.69 75.14 -2.76 
2002 – 03  4.80 5.41 2.41 65.58 -3.35 
2003–04 (RE)  5.91 7.72 3.39 46.40 -2.18 
2004-05 (BE) 
  4.06 4.92 1.28 66.07 -2.51 
Note: Gross Fiscal Gap (GFG) is a measure based on Karnik (2001). It does not
exclude discharge of internal debt and repayment of loans to the center since
both these involve a commitment of resources for the states and factoring them 




Expenditures on Revenue Account and its Components 
 
Revenue 





















account as % of 
revenue 
expenditure 
1993 - 94  82.02  61.79  34.76  27.03  37.87 
1994 - 95  73.96  60.37  35.29  25.08  39.33 
1995 - 96  80.31  60.71  37.86  22.85  39.02 
1996 - 97  83.37  61.86  35.49  26.37  37.72 
1997 - 98  82.73  59.46  37.54  21.92  39.91 
1998 - 99  84.65  57.96  36.74  21.22  41.36 
1999 - 00  77.24  55.65  37.85  17.80  42.45 
2000 - 01  88.61  58.84  38.37  20.47  39.31 
2001 - 02  90.12  52.28  36.93  15.35  46.32 
2002 – 03   85.72  53.99  35.13  18.87  44.34 
2003 – 04 (RE)  73.79  52.43  36.37  16.06  45.20 
2004-05 (BE) 
 86.05  46.43  32.66  13.77  52.26 
Source: Financial Statements, GoM and Budget in Brief, GoM, various issues 
 
  33TABLE A11 
Select Expenditure Categories on Revenue Account 
(As % of Revenue Receipts) 
  Interest 
Payments  Salaries 
Salary+pension 
& retirement 
benefits + interest 
payments 
 
1993 - 94  11.63  43.35  58.31 
1994 - 95  11.66  40.82  55.73 
1995 - 96  12.41  42.63  58.69 
1996 - 97  12.71  41.08  57.89 
1997 - 98  14.29  43.51  62.33 
1998 - 99  16.90  46.14  67.43 
1999 - 00  19.33  65.81  91.43 
2000 - 01  17.67  45.49  70.34 
2001 - 02  21.36  50.77  80.74 
2002 – 03  22.92  49.88  80.93 
2003 – 04 (RE)  22.35  44.45  74.29 
2004-05(BE) 
 25.00  38.10  69.86 
 
TABLE A12 




as % of total 
expenditure 
cap. Exp. On 
soc. Serv as % 
of  capital 
exp.. 
repayment of int. 
debt & of  loans & 
adv to Centre) as 
% of capital exp 
1993 – 94  17.98  3.37  19.28 
1994 - 95  26.04  1.98  9.72 
1995 - 96  19.69  3.02  12.84 
1996 - 97  16.63  2.92  15.18 
1997 - 98  17.27  2.88  16.19 
1998 - 99  15.35  5.98  19.82 
1999 - 00  22.76  2.08  12.54 
2000 - 01  11.39  2.51  23.22 
2001 - 02  9.88  3.17  29.27 
2002 - 03  14.28  2.36  20.68 
2003 – 04 (RE) 26.21  2.17  33.13 
2004-05(BE) 







  34TABLE A13 
Composition of Revenue Receipts 
(as % of revenue receipts) 
 







tax revenue Grants 
1993 - 94  71.13  59.26  18.35  10.52 
1994 - 95  74.05  62.66  19.24  6.71 
1995 - 96  76.16  66.03  16.76  7.08 
1996 - 97  72.66  60.84  19.50  7.84 
1997 - 98  76.05  67.53  17.92  6.03 
1998 - 99  78.78  65.34  16.44  4.79 
1999 - 00  78.65  68.32  15.58  5.77 
2000 - 01  76.13  66.71  18.93  4.95 
2001 - 02  78.94  70.74  15.47  5.59 
2002 – 03  87.88  73.35  14.52  7.28 
2003 – 04 (RE) 78.34  70.17  10.16  8.17 
2004-05 (BE) 
 79.48  70.46  11.74  9.02 
Source: Computed from Financial Statements, GoM and Budget 









  Tax Revenue  1.107 
  State's own Tax Revenue   1.138 
  Sales Tax  1.081 
  Stamps & Registration fees  1.381 
  State excise duties  0.933 
  Electricity duties.  1.435 
  Taxes on vehicles  1.311 
 Taxes on goods & passengers  0.320 
  Land Revenue  1.362 
Source: Computed from Financial Statements, 









  35TABLE A15 
Debt Profile of Maharashtra 
(%) 
 
Dept  as  %  
to GSDP 
 





Share of  Internal 
debt of the State 
Government to 
total debt 




1993-94  13.55 88.16  11.84  11.61 
1994-95  13.44 86.12  13.88  11.67 
1995-96  12.66 84.52  15.48  11.67 
1996-97  13.21 83.84  16.16  11.56 
1997-98  14.48 83.72  16.28  10.96 
1998-99  15.99 84.00  16.00  10.86 
1999 - 00  17.55 83.54  16.46  13.60 
2000 - 01  21.07 83.02  16.98  12.94 
2001 - 02  22.61 81.19  18.81  11.93 
2002 - 03  23.17 68.27  31.73  10.44 
2003 – 04 (RE)  25.23 50.91  49.09  10.88 
2004-05 (BE) 
  25.66 44.88  55.12  10.51 
 
TABLE A16 
Extra Budgetary Operations 
                                                   (Rs. Crores) 
  
Stock of Off budget 
borrowings 
Sum of guarantees 
outstanding 
1993 - 94  0 - 
1994 - 95  0 - 
1995 - 96  0 - 
1996 - 97  975 7636**   
1997 - 98  1621 9933 
1998 - 99  4146 19729 
1999 - 00  6494 32146 
2000 - 01  9534 45979 
2001 - 02  12664 52922 
2002 – 03  13833 n.a 
2003 – 04 (RE)  14181 n.a. 
Source:  
Off budget borrowings: World Bank (2002). Data from 2001-02 
onwards have been obtained from Finance Dept. of GoM, hence 
figures may not be strictly comparable. 
Guarantees: CAG report 2001-02   
http://www.cagindia.org/states/maharashtra/civil/index.htm
 as viewed on June 13
th 2004. 
** sum of guarantee outstanding up to 1996-97 
 
 
  36TABLE A17 
Budgetary Allocations for Power Sector 






& net lending 
(Rs. Crs.) 
Budgetary Support to 
power sector 
(Rs. Crs.) 
   (1)  (2)  (3) = 1 + 2 
1993 - 94  0  450  450 
1994 - 95  0  730  730 
1995 - 96  0  350  350 
1996 - 97  0  760  760 
1997 - 98  0  690  690 
1998 - 99  0  510  510 
1999 - 00  0  450  450 
2000 - 01  2371  220  2591 
2001 - 02  629  719  1348 
2002 - 03  712  439  1151 
2003 - 04(RE)  835  287  1122 
2004-05 (BE) 
 713  161  874 
 
 
TABLE A 18 
Sales and Revenue Receipts of MSEB for the year 2001-02 
 Sales  Revenue 
  Mn. Kwh.  % of total  Rs. Mn.  % of total 
Domestic 9771  20.76  2423.4  19.07 
Commercial 2023  4.30  923.28  7.27 
Agri/Irrign 11911  25.31  980.04  7.71 
Industry 17927  38.09  6864.68  54.02 
Railways 1110  2.36  466.12  3.67 
Other States  700  1.49  182  1.43 
Others 3621  7.69  868.56  6.83 
Total 47063    12708.08   





















1. Capital Receipts  
Maharashtra Budget document gives capital receipts inclusive of Ways and Means Advances and 
Cash Balance Investment.  
RBI classification = Cap. Receipts of Maharashtra Govt. - [ ways & means + cash balance 
investment (net) ].  
(We conform to  RBI def. ) 
 
2. Capital Expenditure.  
Maharashtra Budget document gives capital receipts inclusive of Ways and Means Advances RBI 
classification = Capital Expend of GoM. - ways & means advances 
(We conform to  RBI def. ) 
 
3. Development Expenditure (on revenue account) 
RBI classification = Social Services + Economic services  
GoM budget Social Services + Economic services  + compensation to local bodies  
(We conform to  RBI def. ) 
 
4. Non-development Exp (on revenue account)  
RBI classification  = Exp. on general services.   
GoM budget defines non-devt. revenue expenditure as expenditure on general services + 
expenditure on debt services 
(We conform to  RBI def. ) 
 
5. Development Expenditure (on capital account)  
RBI classification = Expenditure on Economic services + Social Sevices 
Maharashtra Budget = Expenditure on Economic services + Social Sevices + loans by state 
governments 
 
6. Non-Development Expenditure (on capital account)  
RBI classification = expenditure on general services   
Maharashtra Budget =  Discharge of internal debt + repayment of loans  to the Centre (including 
Ways and Means Advances) 
In our study we do not analyse capital expenditures in terms of development / non-development. 
Instead we look at specific expenditure categories. 
 
7. Gross Fiscal Deficit  
Gross Fiscal Deficit = Budgetary Deficit + Borrowings and Lendings (While the definition 
remains the same the nos. in our study are based on RBI definition, hence the figures differ from 
budget documents of GoM  
(Specifically we deducted ways and means advances from capital expenditure and ways and 
means advance and net cash balance investment (CBI) from capital receipts) 
 
8. Primary Deficit  
The Budget in Brief of GoM for 2004-05 has defined  
Primary Deficit = GFD - (interest payments and appropriation for debt servicing).  
We have conformed to previous def. Of Primary Deficit = GFD- Interest Payments  
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